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THE LESSER OF TWO EVILS: EXPLORING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INDEFINITE DETENTIONS OF
TERROR ENEMY COMBATANTS FOLLOWING THE END OF
“COMBAT OPERATIONS” IN AFGHANISTAN
Justin A. Thatch*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 1787, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Phila-
delphia crafted a document poised to organize the U.S. government for all future
generations.1 Despite the protections afforded by the implicit organizational elements
for the separation of powers and checks and balances, the delegated powers in the
document, both explicit and implicit, could not account for every situation and crisis
bound to face the nation.
Historically, the United States has faced national security threats from foreign
nations, pirates, and even a separatist segment of its own people. The terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, however, created a new chapter in the history book of Amer-
ican national security and related law. Following the tragedy of the attacks, there was
a serious fear of continued threats, and the United States responded with measures
to prevent threats of future violence and bring the perpetrators to justice.
The American response led to a “War on Terror” that continues to this day.2 Over
the course of two administrations, the war against al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups has been immensely controversial from both a political and legal standpoint.3
At the forefront of debate has been the treatment and detention of terror suspects.4 The
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1 Constitutional Convention and Ratification, 1787–1789, U.S. DEP’T ST. OFF. HISTORIAN,
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1784-1800/convention-and-ratification [http://perma.cc
/2BGS-JBUE].
2 “War on Terrorism,” GLOBAL POL’Y F., https://www.globalpolicy.org/war-on-terrorism
.html [http://perma.cc/2R2C-37AV].
3 See Jonathan Hafetz, Opinion, Targeted Killing and the ‘War on Terror,’ AL JAZEERA
(Oct. 19, 2011, 7:15 PM), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/20111018729
10456159.html [http://perma.cc/7FLV-3AAL]; see also Scott Shane, Mark Mazzetti & Robert
F. Worth, Secret Assault on Terrorism Widens on Two Continents, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/15/world/15shadowwar.html.
4 See Brendan M. Fischer & Lisa Graves, Costs of War: Detention, WATSON INST. FOR
INT’L & PUB. AFF., http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/social/rights/detention [http://
perma.cc/UCD9-E7TS].
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issues at the heart of the detention debate extend to the conflict as a whole—a con-
stitutional ambiguity concerning the power to combat terrorism and the due process
protections afforded to detainees.5 From a more macro-level perspective, the fight
against terrorism is positioned right at the nexus between the congressional war powers
and the President’s power, as Chief Executive, to respond against threats to domestic
security. Perhaps an even more fundamental question is whether the “War on Terror”
should be treated as a “war” under the Constitution at all. Although these questions
are ever prevalent in the background, the central constitutional question surrounds the
scope of the rights of detained “enemy combatants” under the Due Process Clause.6
The “War on Terror” has an elaborate constitutional history with respect to the
due process rights of terror suspects. The Supreme Court and lower federal courts
have ruled on countless petitions and cases from terrorist detainees, which has created
a new area of jurisprudence governing this issue.7 The end of “combat operations”
in Afghanistan has added a significant wrinkle to the debate surrounding detainee due
process rights,8 and the Supreme Court will likely be called on to decide this issue.
This Note explores how the U.S. Supreme Court should approach this constitu-
tional question. Part I discusses the legal basis for the “War on Terror.” It further ex-
plores some of the key cases in the Supreme Court’s terror detention jurisprudence.
The focus will then shift to recent cases addressing the issues of whether detainees
can be held following the end of “combat operations” in Afghanistan. Part II argues
that the Supreme Court, in ruling on habeas petitions from detainees, should uphold
the executive branch’s constitutional authority to detain terror suspects indefinitely,
even if active combat has ended in Afghanistan. It then explores various legal theories
that the Court may use to justify its decision, including the argument that the end of
combat operations does not preclude the executive branch’s constitutional detention
power. Part III explores possible policy decisions that the elected branches may pursue
in order to provide some clarity on the constitutionality of the detention issue.
When Osama Bin Laden was killed in 2011, some expressed the sentiment that
the “War on Terror” was ending, and President Obama later declared the core of al
Qaeda “decimated.”9 Since that time, however, al Qaeda has attacked the U.S.
Embassy in Benghazi, Libya.10 The world has witnessed the barbaric rise of ISIS in
5 See, e.g., David G. Savage, Constitution Applies to Detainees, Justices Say. It’s Third
Supreme Court Rebuke of Bush’s Policy, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2008), http://articles.latimes
.com/print/2008/jun/13/nation/na-scotus13 [http://perma.cc/X2YW-8Z4F].
6 See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also id. amend. XIV, § 1.
7 See infra Part I (discussing the major cases that relate to issues in this Note).
8 See U.S., NATO Ceremonially End Afghan Combat Mission After 13 Years, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/u-s-nato-ceremonially-end-afghan-combat-mission
-after-13-n263671 [http://perma.cc/87WW-KKT2] (last updated Dec. 8, 2014, 5:53 AM).
9 See Susan Crabtree, WH Insists Al Qaeda Core Is ‘Decimated,’ WASH. EXAMINER
(Sept. 26, 2014, 4:50 PM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/wh-insists-al-qaeda-core-is
-decimated/article/2554038 [http://perma.cc/2WC5-F7YB].
10 See, e.g., Oren Dorell, Senate Says No Doubt Al-Qaeda in on Benghazi, USA TODAY
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Iraq and Syria,11 the violent assassination of Charlie Hebdo staff members in Paris,12
and the recent mass shootings in Paris and San Bernandino.13 This chaos reflects the
reality of the world that we live in today. As one threat subsides, another emerges
and poses a real danger to national security interests. Although the U.S. Constitution
may not fathom an unending war, as the “War on Terror” seems to be, the three
branches can chart a course for further action against terrorist threats that better fits
within a sensible constitutional framework.
I. THE LEGAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE “WAR ON TERROR”
After the 9/11 attacks, the United States entered into a truly unprecedented con-
flict by commencing a full military campaign against a non-state terrorist organiza-
tion.14 The actors involved were therefore operating in a largely unpopulated legal
arena.15 For better or worse, the tools and rhetoric employed by the elected branches
would come to define how the “War on Terror” would be fought. As the conflict
extended over the course of years, many clashes developed over the proper constitu-
tional roles of all three branches of government, but the focus centered on the power
of the President to propagate the “war.”16
A. Basis for Detentions—Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
On September 11, 2001, the United States witnessed the worst terrorist attack on
American soil in the nation’s history as al Qaeda hijackers took the lives of roughly
(Jan. 16, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2014/01/16/al-qaeda
-benghazi-role-known-early/4520871/ [http://perma.cc/N6YS-C4RW].
11 See, e.g., Nick Thompson, Richard Greene & Sarah-Grace Mankarious, ISIS: Every-
thing You Need to Know About the Rise of the Militant Group, CNN, http://www.cnn.com
/2015/01/14/world/isis-everything-you-need-to-know/ [http://perma.cc/249A-SRUE] (last
updated Feb. 10, 2015, 11:59 AM).
12 See, e.g., Maria Abi-Habib, Margaret Coker & Hakim Almasmari, Al Qaeda in Yemen
Claims Responsibility for Charlie Hebdo Attack, WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles
/yemens-al-qaeda-branch-claims-responsibility-for-charlie-hebdo-attack-1421231389 (last
updated Jan. 14, 2015, 8:12 PM).
13 Michael S. Schmidt & Richard Pérez-Peña, F.B.I. Treating San Bernardino Attack as
Terrorism Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/05/us/tashfeen
-malik-islamic-state.html; Paris Attacks: What Happened on the Night, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34818994 [http://perma.cc/4RS8-C8Q4].
14 See Heinz Klug, The Rule of Law, War, or Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 365, 372–73
(2003) (explaining the United States’ “generalized” War on Terror).
15 Id. at 366.
16 Alison Parker & Jamie Fellner, Above the Law: Executive Power After September 11
in the United States, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS AND
ARMED CONFLICT 140, 140–55 (2004), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k4/download/wr2k4
.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q8QZ-EUGT] (outlining the tension between President Bush and the
judiciary in regard to the War on Terror).
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3,000 Americans in New York City and Washington, D.C.17 In the immediate aftermath
of the attacks, President George W. Bush, and many Americans, were ready to strike
back at the responsible parties.18 One week after the attacks, on September 18, 2001,
Congress adopted a joint resolution, known as the AUMF, in order “[t]o authorize
the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent
attacks launched against the United States.”19 Despite the vote by Congress, this was
not a “declaration” of war under Article I of the Constitution.20 This resolution would
essentially become the legal basis for the so-called “War on Terror.”21 Given all the
action it has been used to justify, the brevity of the AUMF is surprising. The real
substance of the resolution is in Section 2, subsection (a), which reads as follows:
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of
international terrorism against the United States by such nations,
organizations or persons.22
In addition to this language, the justifications listed by Congress provide unique
insight into the thought process behind the drafting of the AUMF. First, Congress
17 See September 11th Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11
-anniversary-fast-facts/ [http://perma.cc/SQ34-BSTL] (last updated Sept. 7, 2015, 12:41 PM).
18 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks
(Sept. 11, 2001) (transcript available at SELECTED SPEECHES OF PRESIDENT GEORGE W.
BUSH, 2001–2008, at 57, http://www.georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bush
record/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf [http://perma.cc/VD5P-FYZG])
(“The search is underway for those who are behind these evil acts. I’ve directed the full re-
sources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to
bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these
acts and those who harbor them. . . . America and our friends and allies join with all those who
want peace and security in the world, and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.”).
19 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
20 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to declare war),
with 115 Stat. 224 (authorizing the President to use “necessary and appropriate” force). It is
ultimately this distinction that creates the constitutional dilemma. Where the doctrine on the
law of war and war powers is a little more robust, constitutional law does not provide as
much guidance when it comes to dealing with a global fight against terrorism and the mecha-
nisms deployed to deal with the threats.
21 See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, The Case for Congress Ending Its Authorization of the War
on Terror, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06
/the-case-for-congress-ending-its-authorization-of-the-war-on-terror/276699/ [http://perma.cc
/AN5E-SF8Y] (calling the 2001 AUMF a “blank check” to wage the War on Terror).
22 § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224.
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seemed keen on protecting the United States’ right to self-defense and ensuring the
safety of American citizens at home and abroad.23 Furthermore, it acknowledges that
national security and foreign policy are threatened by terrorist acts, and these acts pose
“unusual and extraordinary” threats.24 Perhaps most importantly, Congress recognized
that the President has constitutional authority to “deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States.”25 Through these suppositions, Congress seems
to endorse a zone of constitutional presidential power where the President can act
to combat terrorism to exercise the nation’s right to self-defense and protect national
security interests. An extension of this theory can be used to support the detention
of terror suspects without such authorization from Congress, such as the AUMF.
Periodically, Congress has reaffirmed its commitment to the President’s power
to detain terror suspects under the AUMF, with the most recent express affirmation
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (the Act).26 The Act
restated the President’s authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force pur-
suant to the [AUMF],” which included the authority “to detain covered persons.”27
In addition to any person connected to the 9/11 attacks, as covered by the AUMF,
the Act also covered
[a] person who was a part of or substantially supported al-Qaeda,
the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any
person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly sup-
ported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.28
Any such covered person could be detained pending the “disposition of a person
under the law of war,” which the Act defined to include detention without trial “until
the end of the hostilities authorized by the [AUMF].”29 Most importantly for deten-
tions, the Act codified “legislative support for law-of-war detention of members of
23 Id. (“Whereas, such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that the United States
exercise its rights to self-defense and to protect United States citizens both at home and
abroad . . . .”).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125
Stat. 1298 (2011).
27 Id. § 1021(a), 125 Stat. at 1562.
28 Id. § 1021(b)(2), 125 Stat. at 1562.
29 Id. § 1021(c)(1), 125 Stat. at 1562. It is this “end of hostilities” question that is at the
heart of the issue that this Note explores. Detainees will argue that the cessation of “combat
operations” in Afghanistan qualifies as such an end, but, with a continued U.S. military presence
in Afghanistan and threat of further attacks, an interpretation that hostilities continue beyond
the end of “combat operations” is entirely reasonable.
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associated forces that, although not directly involved in the September 11 attacks, may
pose threats to the United States currently or in the future.”30
Even though the drafters expressly limited the scope of the Act, journalists and
activists challenged the expansion of detainment power allegedly authorized under
Section 1021(b)(2).31 The plaintiffs feared that the government would construe
their work as “having substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated
forces.”32 They claimed that this section gave the President the authority to detain
American citizens on American soil.33 Although the district court agreed with the
plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction preventing any detentions pursuant to
Section 1021(b)(2),34 the Second Circuit reversed that decision, holding that the
journalists and activists lacked standing because the section says nothing about the
President’s authority to detain American citizens.35 As a result, the court failed to
evaluate the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.36
This suit reflects the sensitive nature of the United States’ approach to its detention
program, but it also highlights the key distinction between “enemy combatants” and
lawful American citizens.37 The AUMF and subsequent affirmations like the National
Defense Authorization Act reflect the commitment of the United States to defend itself
from the threat of foreign terrorists. As a result, it may be necessary to detain certain
“enemy combatants” for indefinite amounts of time. The question of whether terror sus-
pects can truly be detained indefinitely following the cessation of hostilities is what this
Note attempts to answer, and eventually what the federal courts will have to answer.
30 Oona Hathaway et. al, The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After
9/11, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 126 (2013). Seeing as the AUMF was not a constitutional
declaration of war, this can be viewed as an express congressional expansion of the scope
of the AUMF, which could give it scope beyond the plain language of the AUMF. However,
this language is contradictory to the construction clause in subsection (d), which says that
the scope of the President’s power under the AUMF is not expanded or limited. § 1021(d),
125 Stat. at 1562.
31 Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), vacated and remanded,
724 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2013).
32 Hedges v. Obama, 724 F.3d 170, 173 (2d Cir. 2013).
33 Id.
34 Hedges, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 472.
35 Hedges, 724 F.3d at 173–74.
36 Id. at 174. (reversing with no ruling on the merits).
37 This distinction is important to reinforce. In the line of detention cases since the outset
of the war in Afghanistan, both American citizens and foreign nationals have challenged their
detentions. This Note limits its analysis to cases of foreign nationals that fall under the defi-
nition of “enemy combatants.” Terror suspects considered as “enemy combatants” can be
detained indefinitely pending “[t]he disposition of a person under the law of war.” National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021(a)–(c)(1), 125
Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011). Therefore, this Note explores perhaps the final “out” for these certain
suspects—the “end of hostilities” in Afghanistan which no longer makes their detention legal
under the AUMF.
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B. Allowing Detention of Enemy Combatants—Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided the influential detention case of Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.38 Hamdi was a U.S. citizen born in Louisiana who moved with his family
to Saudi Arabia as a child.39 By 2001, he was living in Afghanistan, and, in January
2002, he was captured, turned over to U.S. forces, and taken to Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.40 When the U.S. government learned that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen, he was trans-
ferred to a naval brig in Norfolk, Virginia, and later to another brig in Charleston,
South Carolina.41 The government asserted its right to detain Hamdi indefinitely
because he was an “enemy combatant.”42 Hamdi’s father filed a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, naming his son and himself, as next friend, as petitioners.43
Essentially, Hamdi’s father argued that his son was entitled to the full protections
of the Constitution as an American citizen, and, therefore, he could not be detained
without charges, barred from access to counsel, or subjected to further fundamental
rights violations.44 The district court provided Hamdi with counsel and ordered that
the attorney have access to him.45 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the lower
court’s decision.46 The case bounced around the lower courts until it found its way to
the Supreme Court for review and disposition of the detention issue.47
A plurality of the Justices vacated the Fourth Circuit.48 They held that the AUMF
authorized the detention of individuals classified as enemy combatants, including
those in Hamdi’s position as a citizen-detainee.49 Writing for the plurality, Justice
O’Connor understood enemy combatant to include “an individual who . . . was ‘part
of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners’ in Afghanistan
and who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ there.”50 She went on
to say that detentions were considered “necessary and appropriate force” authorized by
38 542 U.S. 507 (2004).




43 Id. at 511.
44 Id.
45 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“On June 11, 2002, this
Court found that Hamdi’s father had properly filed his habeas petition as next friend, ap-
pointed the Federal Public Defender as counsel for Petitioners, and ordered the Respondents
to allow counsel access to Hamdi.”).
46 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
47 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
48 Id. at 539.
49 Id. at 518 (“We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category
we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured,
is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and
appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to use.”).
50 Id. at 516.
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the AUMF.51 In an attempt to limit the scope of the decision, O’Connor referred to the
“detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the
duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured.”52 This language
would seem to limit presidential detention authority, but she went on to clarify further
by saying that the President’s power to detain under the AUMF may be different when
“the practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the
conflicts that informed the development of the law of war.”53 Recognizing the sensitiv-
ity surrounding the issue of detention and the uncertain nature of the “War on Terror,”
the Court employed this language to leave an open door for changing circumstances.
Although they did not sign on to the plurality opinion, Justices Souter and
Ginsburg concurred in the judgment of the Court, but they did not believe that the
AUMF gave the executive branch the authority to detain in the manner expressed
here.54 Souter drew attention to another statute, the Non-Detention Act, which says
that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States ex-
cept pursuant to an Act of Congress.”55 In essence, Justice Souter did not interpret the
AUMF as an exception to the non-detention rule, and he found that Hamdi could not
be detained further given the mandate of the Non-Detention Act.56 Thus, he did not
reach the merits of many of the constitutional issues that the plurality considered
with regard to due process protections.57
Justice Scalia authored a dissent, joined by Justice Stevens, that did not approve
of the detention of an American citizen without cause.58 He believed that a U.S. citizen
accused of engaging in war against the United States was to be charged with “treason
or some other crime” under the Constitution.59 Justice Scalia believed that this must
be the proper course of action unless the writ of habeas corpus was properly suspended
under the Suspension Clause.60 He admitted that he was not sure whether prosecu-
tion for treason or other crimes is sufficient to meet the national security necessities,
but he asserted that the proper avenue is for Congress to expressly suspend the writ
of habeas corpus under its express constitutional authority.61
51 Id. at 519 (“In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use spe-
cific language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield
is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary and appropriate
force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circum-
stances considered here.”).
52 Id. at 518.
53 Id. at 521.
54 Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55 Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2012).
56 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57 Id.
58 Id. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
59 Id. at 554.
60 Id.
61 Id. at 578.
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Lastly, Justice Thomas penned his own dissent, which is discussed at length later
in this Note.62 Overall, the Hamdi case both represents a landmark decision in the terror
detention jurisprudence and influenced many of the later cases decided on the subject.
C. Allowing Access to Federal Courts—Boumediene v. Bush
In Boumediene v. Bush63 in 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in a 5–4 decision that
detainees were entitled to use the writ of habeas corpus to challenge their deten-
tions.64 In response to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld65 a few years earlier,
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 to authorize military com-
missions for the prosecution of enemy combatants after the Supreme Court rejected
the previously established military tribunals as unconstitutional.66 Section 2241(e)
of the statute removed jurisdiction over habeas petitions of detainees from the federal
courts.67 The majority held that any denial of habeas rights of the detainees must be
in accordance with the Suspension Clause of the Constitution.68 Furthermore, the
Court ruled that the Detainee Treatment Act did not provide an effective substitute
for habeas corpus.69
Two dissents were authored by Chief Justice Roberts and by Justice Scalia. The
Chief Justice objected to the majority providing aliens, who were determined to be
enemy combatants, habeas corpus rights under the Constitution.70 He viewed the
majority’s decision as an inappropriate negation of a procedural system set up by the
elected branches after “careful investigation and thorough debate.”71 Roberts saw no
victory for detainees, as they were now only guaranteed more litigation to determine
the content of their habeas rights as enemy combatants.72 He was further frustrated
by the majority’s decision to upset the findings and law-making of Congress, which
“attempt[ed] to ‘determine—through democratic means—how best’ to balance the
security of the American people with the detainees’ liberty interests.”73
Justice Scalia objected on a broader level than Roberts. He felt strongly that the writ
of habeas corpus has never been viewed to benefit aliens abroad, and he felt that the
Suspension Clause had no application to this case.74 Calling the majority’s decision
62 See infra Part II.A.
63 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
64 Id. at 798.
65 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
66 See id. at 576–77; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012). 
67 See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).
68 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“This Court may not impose a de facto suspension by
abstaining from these controversies.”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
69 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 795.
70 Id. at 803 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
71 Id. at 801.
72 Id. at 826.
73 Id. (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring)).
74 Id. at 827 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
1214 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:1205
“devastating,” Scalia seemed troubled by the stripping of military authority and thus
cited instances where thirty detainees, who had been released from Guantanamo
Bay, returned to the battlefield, with one resuming his post as a senior Taliban
commander.75 From a practical standpoint, he expressed worry about how the
military is given “the impossible task of proving to a civilian court . . . that evidence
supports the confinement of each and every enemy prisoner.”76 In a hyperbolic
conclusion, Justice Scalia warned that “[t]he Nation will live to regret what the
Court has done today.”77 Regardless of whether this is true, many of the same
concerns addressed in Boumediene are still at issue today.
As a result of the five-Justice majority ruling, enemy combatants detained in
places like Guantanamo Bay could now challenge their detentions in federal court.78
In recent years, a new argument has emerged to support detainee habeas petitions.
After President Obama announced plans to end combat operations in Afghanistan by
the end of 2014,79 detainees began preparing to argue that the AUMF, which autho-
rizes their detentions, has lapsed with the end of active combat.80 In fact, the Supreme
Court has hinted at this type of argument already.
D. Supreme Court Begs the Question—Hussain v. Obama
In April 2014, the Supreme Court rejected Abdul Al Qader Ahmed Hussain’s
petition for a writ of certiorari.81 Hussain was a citizen of Yemen who was captured in
Pakistan in March 2002.82 He had been living in both Pakistan and Afghanistan
75 Id. at 828–29. This Note argues that the Supreme Court should take these still-prevalent
concerns into account when deciding whether to continue to allow detentions following the
end of “combat operations” in Afghanistan.
76 Id. at 850.
77 Id.
78 See id. at 732–33 (majority opinion).
79 The United States and Afghanistan have recently signed a security agreement that will
allow U.S. troops to remain in the country. If the deal were not signed, U.S. troops were slated
to leave the country by the end of 2014. Despite the continuing presence of U.S. troops, overall
involvement will be winding down. According to President Obama, about 5,500 U.S. troops
will stay in Afghanistan into 2017. Greg Jaffe & Missy Ryan, Obama Outlines Plan to Keep




80 Charlie Savage, Decaying Guantánamo Defies Closing Plans, N.Y. TIMES, http://www
.nytimes.com/2014/09/01/us/politics/decaying-guantanamo-defies-closing-plans.html (last
updated Sept. 4, 2014) (“[T]he government is bracing for a wave of new habeas corpus law-
suits after combat operations in Afghanistan come to an end in December, raising the question
of whether the legal basis for wartime detentions—the 2001 authorization to use military
force against the perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks—has expired.”).
81 Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621 (2014) (denying petition for writ of certiorari).
82 Hussain v. Obama, 718 F.3d 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013), cert denied, 134 S. Ct. 1621
(2014).
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since 1999.83 In November 2000, Hussain was living near the front lines of the war
between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance.84 He lived with Taliban members
who gave him an AK-47 and “trained him in its use.”85 After the 9/11 attacks, Hussain
fled Afghanistan into Pakistan where he was captured and transferred to Guanta-
namo Bay.86
Hussain sought a petition of habeas corpus from the district court, but the case
was stayed when the court was uncertain of its jurisdiction to hear petitions from
Guantanamo detainees.87 After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Boumediene,
the district court heard Hussain’s habeas petition, but it was denied.88 The district
court ruled that Hussain was either a member of al Qaeda or the Taliban when he
was captured.89 It relied on the circumstances of what he was doing and with whom
he was staying while he was in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the court did not find
his explanations for these actions plausible.90
Hussain appealed his case to the D.C. Circuit where the decision to deny the
habeas petition was affirmed.91 He then sought review from the Supreme Court, but
his petition for certiorari was denied.92 An opinion by Justice Breyer was issued
respecting the denial of certiorari.93 Justice Breyer drew attention to the possibility
that, even if Hussain was a member of al Qaeda or the Taliban, he was not an “in-
dividual who . . . was part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or
coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States there.”94 He further observed: 
The Court has not directly addressed whether the AUMF
authorizes, and the Constitution permits, detention on the basis that
an individual was part of al Qaeda, or part of the Taliban, but was
not “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States” in
Afghanistan prior to his capture. Nor have we considered whether,
assuming detention on these bases is permissible, either the AUMF






88 Id. at 966–67.
89 Id. at 967.
90 Hussain v. Obama, 821 F. Supp. 2d 67, 79 (D.D.C. 2011) (describing Hussain’s non-
sensical justifications).
91 Hussain, 718 F.3d at 966.
92 See Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621 (2014).
93 Id. at 1622.
94 Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 516 (2004)).
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The circumstances of Hussain’s detention may involve these
unanswered questions, but his petition does not ask us to answer
them.95
As the global fight against terrorist threats continues, the Court will likely be faced
with these exact questions. Administrations, current and future, may seek to detain
indefinitely individuals who have engaged in open hostility against our country, but
these individuals may not be actively engaged in a “war” or “conflict” against the
United States. Put another way, the question surrounds whether an individual can
be detained solely on the basis of Taliban or al Qaeda membership.96
In fact, the government has been advancing this argument in recent habeas cases.97
The Supreme Court, however, has not decided whether membership in a terrorist
group alone is sufficient to justify detention.98 The implication in Hussain is that the
government may need to prove the suspect was “engaged in an armed conflict.”99 This
argument has been advanced in one case and rejected by the D.C. Circuit in Khairkhwa
v. Obama.100 Khairkhwa argued that the government needed to prove that he “fought
or engaged in armed conflict or hostilities against the United States or its allies.”101
The court concluded that proof that the individual actively engaged in combat
was “unnecessary.”102 It relied on the D.C. Circuit’s earlier decision of Al-Bihani v.
Obama.103 Al-Bihani was a cook for the Taliban who carried a firearm but never
used it in “hostilities.”104 Therefore, he argued that he could be detained only if he
engaged in a direct hostile act like firing his weapon.105 The court rejected this ar-
gument and held that his role as part of active Taliban forces was sufficient to
warrant detention.106 If the Supreme Court were to take up a habeas case with similar
arguments, it is unclear whether the Court would accept them. First, the National
Defense Authorization Act confirms the proposition that the President can detain
individuals as long as they are a member of a group that is hostile to the United
95 Id.
96 Marty Lederman, Justice Breyer’s Intriguing Suggestions in Hussain: A Sign of Habeas





99 Id. (emphasis omitted).
100 703 F.3d 547 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
101 Id. at 550 (quoting Petitioners Brief at 9, Khairkhwa, 703 F.3d 547 (No. 13-638)). He
actually extended his argument further, claiming that the government had to prove that he
would pose a danger to the United States in the future if he were to be released. Id.
102 Id.
103 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 929 (2011).
104 Id. at 869–70.
105 Id. at 871.
106 Id. at 871–73.
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States.107 Second, in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor based her reading of the AUMF on
“longstanding law-of-war principles.”108 The historical function of detention has
been to get enemy combatants off the battlefield and prevent them from returning
to the enemy and active combat.109 This would seem to apply to soldiers who have
not necessarily engaged in an open fight or have been ordered into battle.
Justice Breyer’s dissent from denial of certiorari sheds light on the essential
question this Note seeks to answer.110 United States combat presence in Afghanistan
has ceased, and detainees will bring habeas petitions citing the very questions the
Supreme Court acknowledged in Hussain—whether detentions are constitutionally
permissible outside of “active hostilities.”111
E. Ripeness of the Issue—Al Odah v. United States
In August 2014, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ruled on the habeas petition of Fawzi Khalid Abdullah Fahad al Odah.112 Al Odah
was a Kuwaiti citizen who had traveled to Afghanistan.113 He was captured by
“Pakistani border guards in Tora Bora, Afghanistan in December 2001, and [then]
turned over to U.S. military forces.”114 Early the next year, al Odah was transferred
to Guantanamo Bay and has been detained there for more than twelve years.115
In May 2002, al Odah first sought a writ of habeas corpus and argued that he
was not an enemy combatant and thus could not be detained.116 It was not until
August 2009 that the district court held that more likely than not al Odah had been
a part of the Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.117 Therefore, he could be
classified as an enemy combatant under the AUMF.118 Like detainee Hussain, the
court did not find al Odah’s explanations for his activities credible.119 The ruling was
107 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81,
§ 1021(a)–(c), 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011).
108 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004) (“Further, we understand Congress’
grant of authority for the use of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ to include the authority to
detain for the duration of the relevant conflict, and our understanding is based on long-
standing law-of-war principles.”).
109 See In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th Cir. 1946) (“The object of capture is to pre-
vent the captured individual from serving the enemy.”).
110 See Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621, 1622 (2014).
111 Id.
112 Al Odah v. United States, 62 F. Supp. 3d 101, 103 (D.D.C. 2014).
113 Id.
114 Id. at 104.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 Id. This application of a “more likely than not” standard reflects the court’s willingness
to defer to the judgment of the executive branch.
119 Id.
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upheld by the D.C. Circuit in 2010, where they found the evidence against al Odah
was “so strong” to sustain the district court’s finding, regardless of the standard of
review.120 His petition for certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in 2011.121
Al Odah renewed his challenge to his detention following the purported plans
by the United States to end active combat in Afghanistan.122 He contended that the
cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan made his detention illegal under the AUMF.123
Al Odah specifically cited President Obama’s 2013 State of the Union address
where he declared that the war in Afghanistan would be over by the end of 2014.124
He also noted that the government took concrete steps to implement the withdrawal,
including transferring control of U.S. detention facilities to the Afghan government
and turning over Afghan districts to Afghan security control.125 However, the district
court once again denied al Odah’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.126 The court
concluded that the claim was “not ripe because it [was] dependent on future events
that may not occur as anticipated, or may not occur at all.”127 In essence, according
to the court, al Odah could not challenge the legality of his detention when his de-
tention was not yet illegal. The district court summarized:
Petitioner does not allege that he is currently unlawfully detained,
but rather that he will be unlawfully detained once the United
States’ war in Afghanistan has come to an end. Such future un-
lawful detention, however, is speculative, as Petitioner’s claim
relies upon the assumption that the government will not release
him once it no longer has the authority to detain him under the
AUMF. Accordingly, Petitioner’s first claim is not ripe and this
Court lacks jurisdiction to rule on it.128
Although the courts have not addressed detention claims like al Odah’s or
Hussain’s on the merits presently, the recent end of “combat operations” in Afghani-
stan will likely lead to renewed challenges by detainees claiming that the end of
“combat operations” equates to an end of hostilities.129 The Supreme Court will be
120 Al Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8, 16 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct.
1812 (2011).
121 Al Odah v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011).
122 Al Odah, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 106.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 104.
125 Id. (referencing concrete steps that petitioner cited as evidence of implementing the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan).
126 Id. at 114.
127 Id. at 106.
128 Id.
129 This Note assumes that some terror suspects will be detained following an alleged
cessation of hostilities in Afghanistan. Although it is possible that the U.S. government could
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left to evaluate the constitutionality of detaining terrorist “enemy combatants” indefi-
nitely, and it will have to evaluate whether “hostilities” can persist without active
“combat” in Afghanistan. Mainly, the Justices will need to determine whether the
AUMF, or the Constitution more broadly, allows the detention of terrorist enemy
combatants without an active deployment of U.S. troops in combat. It is a question
that has not been addressed in any of the major detention cases heard by the Court.
As the nation moves farther away from the war in Afghanistan, and with growing
threats from other groups like ISIS, it may be time to further evaluate the definition
and treatment of “enemy combatants” and the rules regarding their detention.
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TERROR DETENTIONS AFTER CESSATION OF
“COMBAT OPERATIONS” IN AFGHANISTAN
The United States continues to detain individuals it deems serious threats to na-
tional security.130 After the end of active combat operations in Afghanistan, it would
be impractical to release the most dangerous of the detainees. In the “war” that the
United States faces today, the enemy often consists of religious radicals who will
use any tactics necessary to inflict suffering on Americans domestically and over-
seas.131 A report conducted six years ago concluded that one in seven of the 534
prisoners transferred from Guantanamo Bay had re-engaged in terrorist or militant
activity.132 With continued threats today from terror groups like ISIS, any released
detainees could easily join the organization to continue to combat U.S. interests in
the Middle East.133 This reality and the continuing global threat will likely influence
the merits of any constitutional decision-making process on detentions.
Furthermore, it may be impractical to bring these detainees to trial in either a
military or civilian setting. The government may lack sufficient evidence to charge,
or convict, detainees of specific crimes, or the evidence may be classified or come
from protected sources that the government would not be willing to disclose.134
either transfer all detainees or hand them back over to enemy forces, this Note operates under
the condition that some suspects will remain detained for purposes of national security.
130 The Guantánamo Docket: A History of the Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES, http://
projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo (last updated Apr. 4, 2016) (highlighting that 89 detainees
remain at Guantanamo Bay in 2016).
131 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Later Terror Link Cited for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees, N.Y.
TIMES (May 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/21/us/politics/21gitmo.html (high-
lighting the potential that if detainees are moved to the United States’ prisons, there is a risk
of attack).
132 Id.
133 See Justin Fishel & Jennifer Griffin, Sources: Former Guantanamo Detainees Sus-
pected of Joining ISIS, Other Groups in Syria, FOXNEWS.COM (Oct. 30, 2014), http://www
.foxnews.com/politics/2014/10/30/sources-former-guantanamo-detainees-suspected-joining
-isis-other-groups-in.html [http://perma.cc/DKL5-U7J3] (reporting that as many as 30 former
detainees are suspected to have joined overseas terror groups).
134 Alan M. Dershowitz, Opinion, Detentions of War: How Can US Keep Terror Suspects
with No Hope of Trial, but Espouse Due Process?, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www
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Given these circumstances, continued and indefinite detention is the most practical
and appropriate solution to protect national security and the lives of American citizens
at home and abroad. Although such detentions may result in infringements on the due
process rights of terror suspects, sufficient due process protection must be balanced
with the executive branch’s duty to protect the national security of the United States.
The problem then arises of how to strike the appropriate constitutional balance
that weighs all of the competing interests. In Hamdi, the plurality opinion hinted that
detentions can only last for the duration of the conflict.135 Inevitably, federal courts
will face habeas petitions where the petitioner will argue that he was not “engaged
in an armed conflict against the United States,” and the courts will need to determine
“whether . . . either the AUMF or the Constitution limits the duration of detention.”136
In ruling on this matter, the Supreme Court can uphold indefinite detentions after the
cessation of hostilities while respecting the due process boundaries imposed by the
Constitution and relevant jurisprudence.
A. Supporting Detentions in Reliance on Justice Thomas’s Dissent in Hamdi
In a post-cessation world, it will be the prerogative of the district courts to ad-
judicate the habeas claims of continued detainees. Judges can issue rulings that al-
low for deference to the national security interests of the nation while still fulfilling
their role within the constitutional framework. One such method would be to utilize
the judicial deference argument advanced by Justice Thomas in his dissent in Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld.137
In supporting the detention of Hamdi, Justice Thomas believed that the power
to detain was squarely within the war powers of the President, as granted by Con-
gress, and the courts should not constrain the express constitutional authority of the
elected branches.138 Furthermore, in circumstances where the public safety of the
United States or its people are in danger, certain concessions must be made in the
area of due process.139 Justice Holmes once said that “[p]ublic danger warrants the
substitution of executive process for judicial process.”140 He went on to say that “what
is due process of law depends on circumstances. It varies with the subject-matter
[sic] and the necessities of the situation.”141
.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2014/09/15/should-suspected-terrorists-like-those-held-guantanamo
-detained-without-trial/9N2ERaZn75mSSZX67F6rFK/story.html.
135 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
136 Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621, 1622 (2014).
137 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
138 Id. at 579–80.
139 Id. at 590.
140 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (per curiam) (citing Keely v. Sanders, 99
U.S. 441, 446 (1878)).
141 Id. at 84.
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For high-value detainees who pose threats of returning to terrorist activity
against the United States, the exigencies may require continued detention and a dif-
ferent level of due process protection. While detainees will argue that they can no
longer be detained following the end of combat operations in Afghanistan, the gov-
ernment may encourage the district court to deny such habeas petitions because of
their general threat to national security. Especially with the rise of terrorist organiza-
tions like ISIS and continued attacks on U.S. citizens and interests, the government
may maintain that the legislative purpose behind the AUMF was to allow the
President to combat terrorist threats against the nation. Furthermore, it may look to
provisions that seem to broaden the scope of “covered person” under the AUMF.142
It would be within the executive branch’s authority to continue detaining terror
suspects to prevent them from joining further jihadist-led threats against the United
States and its interests.143
Justice Thomas also believed that the power to detain did not end with the
cessation of formal hostilities, but that this detention authority seems based in the
ability to punish those guilty of offenses under the laws of war.144 Therefore, it may
be possible to detain terror suspects indefinitely if they are being held for violations
of the laws of war. However, as discussed further in the next Section, the “War on
Terror” does not fit neatly into a traditional “war” landscape.145 Although the authority
to detain nationals of a belligerent country may continue after the formal cessation
of hostilities,146 the case of al Qaeda members participating in a worldwide effort to
commit violence on U.S. interests does not look all that similar.147 The current state
142 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1021,
125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (allowing detention of an individual who was “a part of or sub-
stantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed
a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces”
(emphasis added)).
143 See Fishel & Griffin, supra note 133.
144 See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 360 (1952) (“It is suggested that, because the occu-
pation statute took effect September 21, 1949, whereas the crime charged occurred October 20,
1949, the constitutional authority for petitioner’s trial by military commission expired before
the crime took place. Such is not the case. The authority for such commissions does not nec-
essarily expire upon cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace.
It may continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its responsibilities
fully.”); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950) (“The jurisdiction of military
authorities, during or following hostilities, to punish those guilty of offenses against the laws
of war is long-established.”).
145 See infra Part II.B.1.
146 At issue in Johnson v. Eisentrager were the habeas petitions of twenty-one German na-
tionals who were convicted of violations of the laws of war for engaging in, permitting, or
ordering continued military activity against the United States after the surrender of Germany
and before the surrender of Japan during World War II. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 766.
147 See, e.g., Abi-Habib, Coker & Almasmari, supra note 12 (explaining terrorist group
attacks on civilian locations).
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of affairs may simply require a development of new standards of detention from that
of the conflicts based in traditional war.
The current reality is that terror threats against the United States are fluid and dy-
namic. At the time of the Hamdi decision, the conflict looked more like a traditional
war with U.S. forces fighting Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan.148 Although
these official operations came to a close in December 2014, American interests are
still under constant threat from terrorist groups worldwide.149 In this world, Justice
Thomas’s argument becomes stronger. It is best for the judiciary to defer to the elected
branches in determining whether to detain enemy combatants, because those branches
possess the latest intelligence and national security information to evaluate threats
and dangers.150 Here, the courts could balance the national security interests of the
country by allowing the President and Congress to make detention determinations
within their constitutional war-making authority.
Given the nature of their violent acts, attempted violent acts, or threatened vio-
lent acts against the United States, the terror suspects will have to forgo some due
process protections. Once again, as Justice Holmes stated, due process depends on
the circumstances, and the continuing terror threats against U.S. interests would per-
mit the continuing incarceration of terror suspects with the goal of maintaining the
safety of the United States and its citizens.151 Lastly, the position of Justice Thomas
comports with the spirit of the stated congressional justifications for the AUMF men-
tioned earlier.152 Viewed holistically, these declarations support the President’s con-
stitutional authority under Article II to ensure the self-defense of the nation. Even
after the end of hostilities in Afghanistan, deference to this constitutional delegation
of power to the executive branch could be a prudent strategy to justify the continued
detention of dangerous terror suspects, and it can be supported using Justice Thomas’s
theories articulated in his Hamdi opinion.
B. Shifting the Focus to Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi Opinion—the “Practical
Circumstances” Exception
In authoring the plurality opinion in Hamdi, Justice O’Connor believed that the
AUMF’s authority to detain suspected terrorists was derived from the President’s
148 See, e.g., Joel Roberts, U.S. Troops in Karbala Clash, CBS NEWS (May 13, 2004,
8:03 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/us-troops-in-karbala-clash/ [http://perma.cc/TW8G
-ZQXP] (describing a battle in Karbala in 2004).
149 See Thompson, Greene & Mankarious, supra note 11.
150 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 582–83 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that
whether Hamdi is an enemy combatant is a determination which is “of a kind for which the
Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to
belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry” (quoting
Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948))).
151 See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
152 See supra Part I.A (discussing listed justifications for the AUMF).
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use of “necessary and appropriate force.”153 However, she qualified this authority
as the power to detain under the “law of war,” which would require enemy combat-
ants to be repatriated after the end of the conflict.154 At the time, this may have been
the appropriate analysis because U.S. ground troops were engaged in open conflict
with al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan.155 Justice O’Connor’s goal,
perhaps rightfully so, seems to have been to limit the scope of the Court’s ruling to
“the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict
in which [the detainees] were captured.”156 This language could very well be used
by the detainees challenging their detentions because it seems to strongly support
the notion that it would be unconstitutional to continue holding them. However, it
may not be that simple.
Interestingly, Justice O’Connor wrote an exception into her opinion. She indicates
that the President’s power to detain could be different if “the practical circumstances
of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the devel-
opment of the law of war.”157 Almost ten years later, Justice Breyer pointed to this
exact language in his certiorari statement in Hussain v. Obama.158 This suggests that
the Justices tend to be cognizant of the changing circumstances and possible exigen-
cies affecting the current landscape. In relying on this “practical circumstances”
exception, the courts will need to look at the current nature of the conflict and see
if it is “entirely unlike” the conflicts that gave rise to the law of war.159 Essentially,
the argument shifts to whether combatting terrorism is a “war.” This analysis is
important to understand whether it is correct to equivocate the end of “combat
operations” in Afghanistan to the end of “hostilities” against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
other terror groups.
1. “War on Terror”—Misnomer?
With just sixty words, Congress created a legal basis for a slew of controversial
executive programs to fight terrorism. As one observer noted, the AUMF “has taken
on a life of its own, and the Executive Branch has used it in ways that no one who
voted for it envisioned in 2001.”160 However, Congress clearly used broad language,
153 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
154 See id. at 520–21.
155 Id. at 510 (“Soon thereafter, the President ordered United States Armed Forces to
Afghanistan, with a mission to subdue al Qaeda and quell the Taliban regime that was known
to support it.”).
156 Id. at 518.
157 Id. at 521.
158 Hussain v. Obama, 134 S. Ct. 1621, 1622 (2014).
159 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
160 SHOON MURRAY, THE TERROR AUTHORIZATION: THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF THE
2001 AUMF 2 (2014) (quoting Jane Harman, Former Representative (D-Cal.), Address at
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specifically the phrase “all necessary and appropriate force,” to allow the President to
take action against those responsible for the 9/11 attacks.161 As we know, the attacking
party was not a foreign sovereign but a terrorist organization, and this is where the
story took an interesting turn. The United States had never engaged in a major conflict
such as the “War on Terror,” and it created “uncharted legal and political territory.”162
However, the Nation was recovering from a devastating attack, and the Bush adminis-
tration decided on a quick, strong retaliation to bring the attackers to justice.163
The manner in which the fight was conducted became a polarizing issue. Strong
critics slammed the Bush administration’s legal policies and believed that the expan-
sion of executive power amounted to tyranny.164 Given the fragility of the national
morale after 9/11 and the continued threat of attacks, this view seems harsh. It may
be that President Bush and his associates were keen on preventing future attacks to
American personnel and seeking justice for the deaths of thousands of innocent
Americans. Perhaps, the government was acting out of “fear of accountability from
a failure to protect the country.”165 President Bush went so far to tell Attorney General
John Ashcroft, “Don’t ever let this happen again.”166
The Bush administration made the tactical decision to advance the rhetoric of a
“War on Terror.” After the AUMF was authorized, it was interpreted as a war against
al Qaeda.167 However,
“[t]hroughout history, wars have typically been declared and
fought between states and against clearly identifiable combatants,
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Event, “AUMF: Reassessing the Role
of Congress,” July 11, 2013).
161 See id. at 2–3 (quoting Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40,
115 Stat. 224 (2001)).
162 Id. at 3.
163 DONNA G. STARR-DEELEN, PRESIDENTIAL POLICIES ON TERRORISM: FROM RONALD
REAGAN TO BARACK OBAMA 124 (2014).
164 HOWARD BALL, BUSH, THE DETAINEES, & THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER PRESI-
DENTIAL POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR 4 (2007) (“The post-2001 military and national
security strategy developed and boldly implemented by President Bush and his lieutenants
is a startling tale of . . . the presidency . . . trying to assume all powers: executive, legislative,
and judicial, as well as that of commander in chief of the nation’s armed forces. Whether
justified in the name of national security or in the cause of maintaining order, this uniting of
all power in the hands of the president is tyranny.”).
165 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, LONG WARS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210 (2013) (“Regardless
of how the Bush administration’s actions prior to 9/11 are assessed, everyone in the executive
branch was acutely aware that they would be blamed for another attack. This well illustrates the
logic of the post-1945 constitutional order, in which presidents since Truman have been
handed what seemed to them sole responsibility for protecting the country from danger.
Thus, administration officials could have reasonably believed there was a national consensus
that all measures necessary must be taken.” (footnotes omitted)).
166 Id. (referring to another 9/11-like attack on American soil).
167 See MURRAY, supra note 160, at 2–3.
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but this new enemy is neither organized by state affiliation nor
located in a specific geographic area.” Because the resolution is
aimed at a terrorist network, rather than a state, it has no geo-
graphic limitation and no clear temporal stopping point. The autho-
rization gave the executive branch the latitude to conduct armed
conflicts in many unspecified locations around the globe . . . .168
This is indeed a unique conflict. Perhaps, one that fits in a potential “zone of twi-
light”169 between Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s power to repel
sudden attacks against the United States.170
Looking at the true nature of the conflict against international terrorism, it may
be difficult to continue speaking in “war” rhetoric. Thankfully, since 9/11, the United
States has experienced infrequent attacks against its assets, which then begs the
question of whether the nation is engaged in a “war” at all.171 However, with the
continual growth of new terrorist groups and the continual threats to American well-
being from groups like ISIS, there seems to be a pervasive sense of danger.172 From
a legal standpoint, it is true that “the Constitution has never been understood to allow
for an unending war, one that has no definite end-point.”173 This issue becomes
especially significant in the case of detentions, which the Supreme Court acknowl-
edges are allowed under the AUMF due to “longstanding law-of-war principles.”174
168 Id. at 3 (footnotes omitted).
169 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial
of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution
is uncertain.”).
170 See STARR-DEELEN, supra note 163, at 124–25. In fact, Bush administration officials
did not feel that the AUMF was necessary to orchestrate a military response following 9/11.
Id. They believed the President possessed the constitutional authority to act unilaterally
against terrorist threats. Id. The Obama administration has also advanced this argument in
support of its actions against terror threats. Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress
to Approve ISIS Strikes, but Says It Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2014), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/world/middleeast/white-house-invites-congress-to-approve
-isis-strikes-but-says-it-isnt-necessary.html.
171 See MURRAY, supra note 160, at 6 (“The ‘war’ narrative as it relates to groups and
countries areas [sic] outside of Afghanistan also has increasingly lost facial credibility as
time passes. The infrequency of terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, or even against
U.S. assets, has challenged the characterization that the United States is in a conflict of enough
intensity to justify the legal framework that comes with ‘war.’”).
172 See, e.g., id. at 97 (highlighting efforts to expand the AUMF to combat new threats).
173 Lyle Denniston, Constitution Check: Is the President’s Power to Detain Terrorism
Suspects About to Lapse?, NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Sept. 4, 2014), http://blog
.constitutioncenter.org/2014/09/constitution-check-is-the-presidents-powers-to-detain
-terrorism-suspects-about-to-lapse/ [http://perma.cc/J4HQ-JURT].
174 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
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Therefore, in assessing whether the “practical circumstances” have changed following
the end of “combat operations” in Afghanistan, the Supreme Court must decide whether
the “War on Terror” fits under the umbrella of “war” jurisprudence and analysis.
2. Terrorism—Criminal Act or Act of War?
The theoretical war over the categorization of terrorism is just as hard-fought
as the conflict on the battlefield. The Bush administration chose the “war” side of
the debate because “only the military has the capability to do what must be done.”175
Known as the armed-conflict model, this view treats terrorism as “war” due to the
“signature violence and indiscriminate killing” involved, and it recognizes the fact
that terrorists routinely violate international laws of war and tend to target civilians
while fighting.176 Proponents feel that terrorism is “a national security threat that im-
perils the very existence of the state.”177
The National Constitution Center has described the situation appropriately:
America has been involved in many wars, some conducted
in ways that fully complied with limits set by the Constitution, and
some that were not. But the Constitution has never been understood
to allow for an unending war, one that has no definite end-point.
As the U.S. military combat effort in Afghanistan approaches its
planned conclusion . . . , federal courts are certain to be drawn into
a new controversy over what that will mean, constitutionally.178
Given the unending nature of the “War on Terror,” it begs the question whether it
can be treated as a traditional “war” at all—a conflict that led to the development of
the law of war.179 The modern conflict is not a congressionally declared war against
a foreign state, probably what could be defined as a true “war.”180 Although the
express power to “declare” such a war rests with Congress,181 the Supreme Court has
recognized the President’s power to protect U.S. interests abroad.182
Just before the outbreak of the Civil War, Supreme Court Justice Nelson, on circuit,
decided the case of Durand v. Hollins.183 In rejecting a suit against the executive
175 See STARR-DEELEN, supra note 163, at 124 (quoting JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR
AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 10 (2006)).
176 Id. at 9.
177 Id.
178 See Denniston, supra note 173.
179 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520–21.
180 Id.
181 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
182 See, e.g., Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111, 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
183 Id.
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branch, Justice Nelson expressed the President’s authority to protect U.S. citizens
and property overseas.184 When there is danger to American interests abroad,
for the protection of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty
must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the president. Acts of
lawless violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his
property, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and the protec-
tion, to be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently, require
the most prompt and decided action.185
This type of language is what creates instances of constitutional confusion, especially
in the case of terrorism. On its face, actual or threatened terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens
or property abroad would allow the President to take action against those responsible
under cases like Durand. Therefore, from a hypothetical standpoint, even when the
congressional legislation such as the AUMF, which strengthens Presidential war-
making authority, lapses, the President can still take action to protect U.S. citizens
abroad. With evidence of recidivism amongst released Guantanamo detainees,186 the
government can make a strong argument to the courts that continued detention is within
the President’s constitutional authority to protect U.S. citizens in danger overseas.
After the tragedy of 9/11, advancing the rhetoric of a “War on Terror” may have
been politically beneficial for the Bush administration. All of these years later, it
perhaps became clearer that the United States is not fighting a “war” against groups
like al Qaeda. The “War on Terror” plays out more like the “War on Drugs.” It rep-
resents the attitude that the U.S. government is taking against perceived threats to its
interests. The reality is that defining this conflict as a “war” has grown to be unpop-
ular on an international scale. For example, the Obama administration’s escalated
use of drone strikes to kill targets abroad, which some view as a move away from
indefinite detentions,187 has been met with disfavor in many foreign nations.188
Perhaps much of this disfavor stems from, in the early years, trying to fit the
“War on Terror” into a traditional law-of-war framework. In a case like Hamdi, it
may have been best to recognize the “practical circumstances” exception from the
start and craft a clearer constitutional landscape around acts of terrorism, which are
sure to be a continuing threat for the foreseeable future.189 It may not be too late to
take such action. As the nation has now ended combat operations in Afghanistan and
moves toward the withdrawal of all troops from Afghanistan in the coming years,190
184 Id.
185 Id. at 112.
186 See Fishel & Griffin, supra note 133.
187 See MURRAY, supra note 160, at 75.
188 Id. at 84–85.
189 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
190 See David Jackson, Obama Hails End of Combat Operations in Afghanistan, USA
TODAY: THE OVAL (Dec. 28, 2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2014
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it would behoove all three branches of government to work together to chart a clearer
constitutional course for the future.
After almost fourteen years of fighting al Qaeda across the globe, it is clear that
the conflict does not look like a “war” in the traditional sense. The United States’ ap-
proach to combating the terror threat has often been responsive, with an almost ad
hoc approach to thwarting jihadist assailants and detaining them in the interests of
national security.191 Given the dynamic nature of the current landscape, the “practical
circumstances” argument allows the Supreme Court to pivot and chart a new course
for the future of “War on Terror” constitutional jurisprudence. It could invoke this
“practical circumstances” exception in its evaluation of whether detentions can con-
tinue under the AUMF and Due Process Clause now that “combat operations” have
ended in Afghanistan.
C. Effect of the End of “Combat Operations”
Given the already lengthy debate regarding the classification of terrorism and
its related conflicts, the questions grow more complex after the cessation of “combat
operations” in Afghanistan. Although President Obama has “hailed” the end of the
“war,” it is not clear if the “war” is actually at an end.192 Although active military
operations have ceased, a contingency of American troops will remain in Afghanistan
for other defensive and training purposes.193 More recently, President Obama has fur-
ther halted troop withdrawal by keeping 9,800 troops in Afghanistan through the end
of 2016.194 Furthermore, although the United States military will not be engaged in
organized combat in Afghanistan, there is still a continued international threat from
/12/28/obama-afghanistan-combat-operations-end-statement/20969021 [http://perma.cc/A6AB
-F3DZ].
191 Michaela Dodge, Lisa Curtis & Jessica Zuckerman, Eleven Years Later: U.S. Should
Not Lose Momentum in the War on Terrorism, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2012), http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/09/counterterrorism-strategy-us-should-not-lose
-momentum-in-war-on-terrorism [http://perma.cc/F9NA-LKRR].
192 See Jackson, supra note 190. But see Philip Ewing, U.S. Military Role in Afghanistan Will
Still Be Combat, POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2014/11/barack-obama-military
-afghanistan-113110.html [http://perma.cc/6BU7-H2GY] (last updated Nov. 22, 2014, 3:40
PM) (explaining the Obama administration’s plans to continue airstrikes against Taliban forces
following the end of “combat operations” in December 2014); Jaffe & Ryan, supra note 79
(explaining that 5,500 troops will stay in Afghanistan until 2017).
193 See Masoud Popalzai & Jason Hanna, Afghanistan Signs Deal Keeping U.S. Troops
Beyond 2014, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/30/world/asia/afghanistan-us-security
-agreement/ [http://perma.cc/Z9YM-3D3M] (last updated Oct. 1, 2014, 5:33 AM).
194 Jim Acosta & Jeremy Diamond, Obama Again Delays Afghanistan Troop Drawdown,
CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/15/politics/afghanistan-troops-obama/ [http://
perma.cc/QE83-ZTYV] (last updated Oct. 15, 2015, 4:20 PM). In the announcement, however,
President Obama “stressed that the formal combat mission [in Afghanistan] has ended.” Id.
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groups like al Qaeda.195 All of these realities create a troublesome legal puzzle for the
Supreme Court in deciding an Al Odah-esque case that could now be considered ripe
following the official end of “combat operations.”
Detainees will likely contend that their incarceration is no longer justified under
the AUMF and the Due Process Clause. As this Note has discussed, the political
realities make releasing the most dangerous suspects incredibly risky.196 Therefore,
the Supreme Court will need to chart a course that best fits within the desired na-
tional policy. The Justices can choose to rule that the end of “combat operations” has
caused a lapse in AUMF’s authority to detain, and the Due Process Clause requires
the detainees to be released or charged with crimes. Another option would be to de-
cide the case from a more technical standpoint and say that the continued presence
of American troops in Afghanistan, even in an advisory role, results in a determina-
tion of active hostilities. Because such “hostilities” continue, the detentions remain
permissible under the Due Process Clause.
Perhaps the best option would be for the Court to interpret the AUMF as
allowing the detention authority to extend beyond the mere cessation of the “combat
mission.”197 In doing so, it could draw on the legal arguments touched on in this Sec-
tion and highlight the continuing danger and “hostility” that international terrorism
poses for the foreseeable future. The Court may endorse the flexible form of due
process that Justice Thomas recognized in his Hamdi dissent.198 In this way, it does
not shy away from the due process cloud that hangs over the national security reasons
for upholding indefinite detentions. The Justices could recognize the necessity of
due process protection while balancing it against the security needs of the nation.
The Court can further utilize Justice O’Connor’s “practical circumstances” ex-
ception from her Hamdi opinion to highlight the new approach that needs to be
taken towards terrorism jurisprudence now that the conflict has strayed farther from
the traditional “war” definition.199 In doing so, more deference can be afforded to the
President’s constitutional authority to protect the United States from attack and
insurrection and exercise the nation’s right to self-defense. Indeed, the Court should
be concerned with ceding too much control over detainees’ due process rights to the
195 See, e.g., Thomas Joscelyn, High-Ranking US Intelligence Official: Al Qaeda Will Make
Gains in Syria and Afghanistan in 2015, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2015, 11:25 AM), http://
www.businessinsider.com/high-ranking-us-intelligence-official-al-qaeda-will-make-gains
-in-syria-and-afghanistan-in-2015-2015-2 [http://perma.cc/34C5-P5AJ] (highlighting a grow-
ing threat to the West from an official branch of al Qaeda).
196 See Fishel & Griffin, supra note 133; see also Bumiller, supra note 131 (referencing
dangers of terrorist recidivism).
197 See Jackson, supra note 190 (quoting President Obama’s remarks that the United States
is safe after the War on Terror).
198 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 590–92 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing
cases where the Court took a more context-based approach in its Due Process Clause
analysis).
199 Id. at 521 (plurality opinion).
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executive branch. Although the Court should preserve the right to detain individuals
after the end of “combat operations,” the Justices should urge Congress to use the
legislative process to more effectively deal with the issue of terrorist detention mov-
ing forward.
III. CHARTING THE FUTURE OF DETENTIONS—POLICY SOLUTIONS TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM
Although the Supreme Court can justify indefinite detentions through judicial
deference to executive decisions or the Hamdi “practical circumstances” exception,
the political branches can best espouse due process through the policy-making process.
Ideally, the government could devise a system where terror suspects remain detained
or face a type of judicial proceeding where they are afforded due process protections
that conform to the circumstances. The best policy solutions will address the prob-
lem that causes the indefinite detentions—when the government cannot or chooses
not to prosecute the suspects because of evidentiary or security shortcomings.
The issue boils down to the United States choosing between the lesser of two
evils. It can release the detainees, but these detainees may be highly dangerous in-
dividuals who will likely return to terrorist organizations and continue to perpetuate
violence against the United States.200 The other option is to continue to detain them
indefinitely. Even if the President has the power to authorize detentions in the inter-
est of national security, they remain politically unpopular201 and, possibly, inconsistent
with average notions of due process under the law that are synonymous with the
American legal system. Although some will see indefinite detention as an infringement
on detainee rights in any circumstances, action by Congress or the President would
indicate that the United States is sympathetic to these issues while still looking to
preserve the national security. Even though it can be interpreted as maneuvering to help
the United States rationalize its suspension of due process, it would be a step in the
right direction toward a more wholesome, constitutional approach.
One such solution is for Congress to pass a detention law that would regulate
the indefinite detention process.202 The law could allow detainees to have certain due
process protections and a quasi-judicial proceeding. As Professor Alan Dershowitz
recently suggested, Congress could establish a tribunal that will base continued
detention on evidence of continued dangerousness or probability of recidivism.203
Detainees could be provided access to counsel, notice of the charges and proceed-
ings against them, and a heightened burden of proof.204 Lawmakers could also enact
provisions to ensure fair and comfortable treatment for detainees, and, perhaps, they
200 See Bumiller, supra note 131.
201 See id.
202 See Dershowitz, supra note 134.
203 Id.
204 Id.
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could establish special detention centers in which to house and monitor terror suspects.
In many ways this process could provide much-needed transparency in the area of
detentions. It would also provide suspects more due process protections than the current
system, even if those can be justified under the Constitution and related jurisprudence.
In fact, this system would be similar to that employed by Israel. Under the
Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 1979 (EPDL), Israel updated its past deten-
tion statute to allow for more detainee protections.205 They were granted prompt
presentment before the president of the district within forty-eight hours of arrest for
judicial review of the detention, allowed appeals to the supreme court, and mandated
the president of the district court to conduct reviews of the detention every three
months.206 Further, under this law, both Israeli citizens and non-citizens within Israel
may be detained if reasons of “state security or public security” require it, and, on
reviewing appeals from detention orders, the supreme court applies the standard that
the danger must be “‘so grave as to leave no choice but to hold the suspect in ad-
ministrative detention’ or that the [suspect] ‘would almost certainly pose a danger
to public or State security.’”207 In addition, any authorized detention orders lapse
after six months, but they can be renewed indefinitely.208
Israel’s processes should be very meaningful to the United States because Israel
is the United States’ biggest ally in the region and they both face consistent and dan-
gerous threats from terror organizations.209 Due to Israel’s more expansive history
of terror threats and need to protect themselves from such danger, the United States
can learn from their preventive detention process and use it as a guide to chart the
future of its own program. This is especially true when similar rationales underlie
the Israeli system.
Specifically, Israel aims “to protect sources and methods and allow otherwise
inadmissible evidence such as hearsay into evidence.”210 Crafting similar judicial
205 Stephanie Cooper Blum, Preventive Detention in the War on Terror: A Comparison
of How the United States, Britain, and Israel Detain and Incapacitate Terrorist Suspects, 4
HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 6 (2008).
206 Id.
207 Id. (quoting Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism, and the Problem of Administrative
Detention in Israel: Doe a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining Chips?,
18 AM. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 721, 763 (2001)).
208 Id. (emphasis omitted). Again, although this is not ideal, it is a more judicially pro-
tected process than our current process for ensuring detainee rights. Even though indefinite
detentions are still possible (and perhaps likely in certain circumstances), a system of this
kind ensures, at a minimum, that the detainee and his counsel have a right to be heard
periodically. It also requires the government to continue to put forth evidence of a continued
threat to U.S. security.
209 See, e.g., Greg Botelho, Ralph Ellis & Ben Wedeman, 4 Worshipers Killed in Jerusalem
Synagogue; Netanyahu Calls for Unity, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/18/world/meast
/jerusalem-violence/ [http://perma.cc/UGQ5-M7SV] (last updated Nov. 18, 2014, 4:48 PM)
(discussing a terror attack at an Israeli synagogue).
210 See Blum, supra note 205, at 6–7.
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processes will allow the United States to better espouse due process, while still main-
taining the secrecy of sensitive information211 and alleviating concerns over insuffi-
ciency of evidence that may pose a problem in a traditional criminal trial.
Overall, adopting a detention law on the model of Israel’s EPDL seems to be a
significant improvement to the current ad hoc, executive-driven system the United
States currently employs. The legislative process would allow the elected representa-
tives of the people to debate the issues and work out a system that appropriately
achieves the foreign policy and domestic security goals of the nation. Another option
open to U.S. leaders is to modify the AUMF or repeal it and draft a new statute to
better reflect the current realities of the conflict.212 Others are simply looking to ex-
pand the AUMF to include new groups, while some wish to grant the President the
power to use force to combat any terrorist threats facing the United States.213
The nature of any grant of power to the President by Congress is the balance
between flexibility to combat the threat and the fear of broad powers run amok. Re-
gardless of the means employed, if lawmakers wish to modify or craft a new AUMF,
they would be prudent to include provisions on detentions. Given the history of the
current AUMF, it is clear that detaining terror suspects who have committed violent
acts, or have planned or attempted to commit such acts, floats in a turbulent area of
constitutional law and theory. Any future action must pay attention to the lessons—
often harsh—learned in the thirteen years under the AUMF.
CONCLUSION
Now that “combat operations” in Afghanistan have come to a formal close,214
the United States will face a big legal question regarding the constitutionality of its
continued detention of terror suspects. Detainees will likely seek habeas petitions
in federal courts arguing that their detentions are no longer justified due to the in-
applicability of the AUMF outside of active hostilities against al Qaeda and the
211 Israel allows its district judges to review all evidence against a detainee whether it is
classified or not. Id. at 6. The judge then makes an ex parte decision on what information can
be disclosed to the suspect and his counsel. Id. Although decried by some human rights
groups, this process at least allows a neutral party to review the government’s evidence to
determine whether the detainee represents a sufficient national security threat to warrant
administrative detention. Id.
212 Democratic Representative Adam Schiff of California has already introduced such a
bill. See John Bresnahan & Lauren French, Democrat Renews Call for Congress to Authorize
War vs. Islamic State, POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2015, 3:35 PM), http://www.politico.com/story
/2015/12/adam-schiff-military-war-islamic-state-216649 [http://perma.cc/2762-6BPN]. It
would primarily act as an AUMF against ISIS, but it would also repeal the 2001 AUMF and
the 2002 AUMF against Iraq, both of which have been cited as legal sources of authority to
fight ISIS. See id.
213 See MURRAY, supra note 160, at 96–97.
214 See Jackson, supra note 190.
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Taliban in Afghanistan.215 The government will have to advance, and the courts will
then have to evaluate, legal theories justifying the continued detention of high-level
terror threats.
Although some would argue indefinite detention without formal charges expressly
violates due process protections, the courts could adopt constitutionally acceptable
rationales for such action. First, district courts, and later the Supreme Court, could
employ a judicial deference standard in evaluating habeas petitions. The government
can point to the purpose behind the AUMF in granting the President the necessary au-
thority to ensure the right to self-defense and protect the nation from terrorist threats.
It can also cite judicial precedents that recognize the executive branch’s authority
to protect U.S. citizens and property overseas and employ measures to prevent harm
to U.S. interests.
Justice O’Connor’s “practical circumstances” carve-out in her Hamdi plurality
opinion can also be a strong source of support for continued detentions.216 The United
States can shift the rhetoric away from fighting a “War on Terror” to reflect the truer
nature of the modern conflict against terrorist organizations. By showing that the
“practical circumstances” now differ from traditional law-of-war detention schemes,
the government can justify preventive detentions as a necessary means to maintain
national security. This argument is strengthened by evidence of recidivism amongst
released detainees.217
From a more technical standpoint, the courts can simply rule that the end of
“combat operations” in Afghanistan does not equate to an end to active hostilities
against al Qaeda and similar groups. This can be supported by the continued pres-
ence of U.S. troops on the ground in Afghanistan, even if they are not engaged in
formal combat operations.218 Given the turbulent nature of the Middle East and
recent outbursts of violence, this would not be a far-fetched conclusion.
In order to strengthen the constitutional argument of indefinite, preventive de-
tentions, the United States would benefit from offering detainees some due process
protections. As Justice Holmes has said, “[D]ue process of law depends on circum-
stances.”219 Legitimacy of the practice can be enhanced by ensuring comfortable
conditions and treatment of detainees, as well as offering them the assistance of
legal counsel. In addition, the best course of action going forward is to adopt a new
policy to provide clarity to an already murky constitutional landscape. Lawmakers
can draft a preventive detention statute that can provide a detention process that
ensures more protection for detainee rights, as well as sufficient judicial oversight.
As such, the United States makes a more concerted effort to espouse due process in
constitutionally protected executive detentions.
215 See Denniston, supra note 173.
216 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 521 (2004).
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219 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909).
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In the end, no solution will be perfect, and there will always be dissenters who
criticize the process. However, the current global landscape indicates that real threats
still exist to the United States and its interests. Preserving national security has always
been a paramount interest of the nation. The United States can move forward in com-
batting terrorist threats by updating its detention scheme to more truly reflect its com-
mitment to due process under the law. Therefore, the country can move forward in its
efforts to defeat terrorism and protect the national welfare with a detention system
that operates on strong constitutional footing.
